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تأثیر معاملات با اشخاص وابسته بر وجود تحریف در صورت‌های مالی و کیفیت گزارشگری مالی: با تأکید بر تعدیلات سنواتی و خطای برآورد اقلام تعهدی | ||
| پژوهش های تجربی حسابداری | ||
| مقاله 1، دوره 13، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 48، تیر 1402، صفحه 1-26 اصل مقاله (586.67 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22051/jera.2023.42772.3094 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| مجید رستگارپویانی* 1؛ حسین اعتمادی2؛ منصور مومنی3 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران. | ||
| 2استاد گروه حسابداری دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران | ||
| 3استاد گروه مدیریت، دانشکده مدیریت، انشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| درخصوص انگیزه‌های معاملات با اشخاص وابسته دو تئوری رقیب وجود دارد؛ تئوری اول، تئوری قرارداد کارآمد است که در آن فرض می‌شود تعامل نزدیک بین اشخاص وابسته، به شرکت‌ها کمک می‌کند تا هزینه‌های معاملات را در مقایسه با هزینه‌های معامله با اشخاص غیروابسته کاهش دهند؛ تئوری دوم مبتنی بر تئوری نمایندگی و دیدگاه فرصت‌طلبانه است. از منظر این تئوری معاملات با اشخاص وابسته برای سهامداران دارای حق کنترل، مدیران و سایر اشخاص وابسته فرصت‌های مناسبی فراهم می‌کند تا از طریق آنها منابع شرکت را به سود خود و به ضرر سهامداران فاقد حق کنترل خارج کنند. هدف اصلی پژوهش حاضر این است که مشخص شود معاملات صورت‌گرفته با اشخاص وابسته در ایران با کدامیک از این تئوری‌ها سازگار است. برای این منظور تاثیر معاملات با اشخاص وابسته بر ارائه گزارش‌های مالی حاوی تحریف و همچنین تأثیر آن بر کیفیت گزارشگری مالی بررسی شده است. در همین رابطه تعداد 134 شرکت پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی سال‌های 1394 تا 1399 مورد بررسی قرار گرفت. در آزمون فرضیات این پژوهش داده‌های تلفیقی و مقطعی استفاده شده است. نتایج حاصل از تحلیل رگرسیون نشان می‌دهد که مبلغ معاملات با اشخاص وابسته بر تعدیلات سنواتی سال بعد که معیار تحربف در صورت‌های مالی می‌باشد تاثیر مثبت و معنادار دارد. همچنین مبلغ معاملات با اشخاص وابسته بر کیفیت گزارشگری مالی که معیار اندازه‌گیری آن کیفیت اقلام تعهدی است، تاثیر منفی و معنادار دارد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| اقلام تعهدی؛ تحریف؛ تعدیلات سنواتی؛ کیفیت گزارشگری؛ معاملات با اشخاص وابسته | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| The Association between Related-party Transactions and the Existence of Distortions in Financial Statements and the Financial Reporting Quality: The Role of Restatements and Accrual Estimation Errors | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Majid Rastegarpouyani1؛ Hosein Etemadi2؛ Mansour Momeni3 | ||
| 1Ph.D. Student, Department of Accounting, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Professor, Department of Accounting, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 3Professor, Department of Management, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| There are two opposing theoretical frameworks concerning related party transactions in prior studies. The first theory, known as efficient contracting, argues that related-party transactions can be used to optimize internal resource allocation and reduce transaction costs; the second theory, known as agency theory, argues that related-party transactions provide opportunities for controlling shareholders, managers, and others related parties to extract resources from minority shareholders. The main goal of this study is to determine which of these theories is compatible with the transactions made with related parties in Iran. For this purpose, the impact of transactions with related parties on the presentation of financial reports containing distortions and its impact on the quality of accruals has been investigated, and in this regard, the number 134 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2016 to 2021 has been investigated. To test the hypotheses of this research, pooled and cross-sectional data were used, and the regression analysis results show a positive and significant association between the amount of related party transactions and next year's restatements, which is a measure of distortion in financial statements. Also, there is a negative and significant association between the amounts of related party transactions and accrual quality, which is used as a measure of reporting quality in this research. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Related Party Transactions, Accruals, Financial Reporting Quality, Restatements. Distortion | ||
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سایر فایل های مرتبط با مقاله
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| مراجع | ||
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منابع
افلاطونی، عباس. (1392). تجزیه و تحلیل آماری با Eviews در تحقیقات حسابداری و مدیریت مالی، تهران: ترمه.
حاجیها, زهره و عادله آزادزاده. 1399. “رابطه بین معاملات با اشخاص وابسته و کیفیت اطلاعات حسابداری: بررسی نقش رفتار فرصت‌طلبانه مدیران.” پژوهش های تجربی حسابداری 9(2): 187–212.
سرلک, نرگس و مینا اکبری. 1392. “رابطه بین معاملات با اشخاص وابسته و مدیریت سود.” بررسی های حسابداری و حسابرسی 74(20): 77–92.
شعری, صابر و الهام حمیدی. 1391. “شناسایی انگیزه‌های معاملات با اشخاص وابسته.” پژوهش های تجربی حسابداری 2(6): 49–64.
وقفی, سیدحسام, مریم سلمانیان, فرزاد مانیان و علی فیاض. 1397. “بررسی رابطه بین معاملات با اشخاص وابسته با کیفیت افشا، مدیریت سود و سودآوری در شرکت‌های بورس اوراق بهادار تهران.” پژوهش های تجربی حسابداری 28(7): 71–94.
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